Rivers State is drifting into dangerous constitutional waters, and pretending otherwise is self-deception. Governor Siminalayi Fubara’s approval of a ₦1.5 trillion 2026 budget by executive order is not a routine governance decision; it is an emergency response to a system in paralysis.
The justification, an incapacitated House of Assembly crippled by internal rifts, may sound practical, even reasonable. But constitutional democracy is not built on convenience. It is built on process, balance, and restraint.
The argument that “governance must go on” is emotionally persuasive, yet legally fragile.
Nigeria’s Constitution is explicit: appropriation is a legislative function. When the executive assumes that power, even under pressure, it blurs the separation of powers and sets a precedent that future governors, less restrained, more ambitious, will exploit. Today it is Rivers State. Tomorrow, it could be any state where political disagreement is rebranded as legislative incapacity.
Executive orders are not constitutional escape routes. They are administrative tools, not substitutes for parliamentary approval.
If internal conflicts within the House prevent it from sitting, the solution is political engineering, mediation, and lawful intervention, not unilateral fiscal authority. Otherwise, the executive becomes judge, jury, and spender.
Equally troubling is the proposal to have Special Advisers function as de facto Commissioners. This is governed by improvisation.
Commissioners require legislative screening and confirmation for a reason: accountability. Replacing that process with executive fiat hollows out democratic oversight and concentrates power where it least belongs, in one office, under one interpretation of necessity.
Supporters of the governor will argue that paralysis at the legislature forced his hand.
That is only half the truth. Political paralysis does not suspend constitutional supremacy. If the House of Assembly is fractured, the executive should be leading reconciliation, not legislating by decree. Crisis management is not the same as constitutional substitution.
Rivers State does not need a strongman approach disguised as pragmatism. It needs institutional repair. The danger is not just a legal challenge, though that is inevitable, but normalization. Once executive budgeting becomes acceptable “in exceptional circumstances,” the exception quietly becomes the rule.
This is a warning moment. If Rivers crosses this line without consequence, Nigeria’s already fragile constitutional culture weakens further. Governance must indeed go on, but not at the cost of the Constitution itself. When legality is sacrificed on the altar of urgency, democracy does not advance; it retreats.
